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Recent Developments 
Johnson v. State: 
Upon the Defendant's Request, the State Must Furnish a Defendant's Recorded 
Statement, Even if the State Only Intends to Use the Content of the Recording at 
Trial 
T he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that pursuant 
to Maryland Rule 4-263, upon a 
defendant's request, the State must 
furnish a defendant with his prior 
recorded statement made to a State 
agent and may not introduce the 
substance of that statement through 
the testimony of a State agent at trial. 
Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 757 
A.2d 796 (2000). The court found 
that recorded statements made to a 
State agent should be made available 
to a defendant so that he might 
effectively prepare his case for trial. 
On August 2, 1996, police 
interrogated Larry Marcus Johnson 
("Johnson") for his suspected 
involvement in several household 
burglaries. Johnson was interrogated 
again on August 14, 1996, and this 
interrogation was apparently 
videotaped. After the interrogation, 
the police obtained a warrant to 
search Johnson's home and 
workplace, which resulted in the 
seizure of hundreds of stolen items. 
Johnson was ultimately charged with 
first-degree burglary and fourteen 
counts of theft over $300. 
In a pre-trial hearing, Johnson 
requested a copy of the State's 
recording of his statement, 
reasoning that the recording was 
vital for possible suppression 
purposes, and to prepare cross-
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examination of the interrogating 
officer. The Circuit Court of Anne 
Arundel County, however, held that 
discovery rules required only that the 
defense receive the substance of any 
oral statements, and allowed the 
substance ofJohnson's statements to 
be introduced via the testimony of the 
interrogating officer. The trial judge 
then found Johnson guilty of the 
charges. The court of special appeals 
affirmed, reasoning that the trial court 
did not err because the substance of 
the content of Johnson's recorded 
statement had been provided through 
the testimony of the interrogating 
officer. 
The primary issue on appeal was 
whether, pursuant to Rule 4-
263(b )(2), the State was required to 
provide to the defense a recorded 
statement where, instead of 
introducing the recording at trial, it 
presented the substance of the 
statement through the testimony of the 
interrogating officer. Johnson, at 253, 
757 A.2d at 798. The court began 
its analysis by considering the 
discovery requirements of Rule 4-
263. !d. at 264, 757 A.2d at 803. 
Upon the defendant's request, the 
State's attorney shall: 
. . . [a]s to all statements 
made by the defendant to a 
State agent that the State 
intends to use at a hearing or 
trial, furnish to the defendant, 
... (A) a copy of each written 
or recorded statement, and 
(B) the substance of each 
oral statement and a copy of 
all reports of each 
statement. .. 
Id. at 264, 757 A.2d at 804 
(quoting Md. Rule 4-263(b )(2)). 
The court reasoned that the 
scope of pretrial disclosure required 
by Rule 4-263 is a product of its dual 
purposes. !d. at 265, 757 A.2d at 
804. First, in terms of fundamental 
fairness, broad discovery rules aid 
defendants in preparing their defenses 
and protect them from surprise at trial. 
!d. Second, Rule 4-263 is designed 
''to force the defendant to file certain 
motions before trial, including a 
motion to suppress any unlawfully 
obtained statement." !d. (quoting 
White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 734, 
481 A.2d 201, 208 (1984)). 
Moreover, "[t]he defendant cannot 
be expected to file such motions prior 
to trial unless he can obtain the 
necessary information to prepare for 
the suppression or exclusion hearing." 
!d. (quoting Warrick v. State, 302 
Md. 162,169, 486 A.2d 189, 193 
(1985)) . 
In analyzing Rule 4-263, the 
court considered the plain text ofthe 
rule. Id. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804. 
Under a plain meaning analysis, the 
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court had no doubt that Johnson's 
counsel made pretrial requests to 
receive a copy ofhis client's recorded 
statement. !d. at 266, 757 A.2d at 
805. Despite his requests, however, 
the statement was not forthcoming. !d. 
Instead, the State introduced the 
substance of Johnson's statement 
through the interrogating officer, 
rationalizing its position by arguing that 
it did not intend to use or play the 
actual recording itself at trial. !d. The 
court held, however, that the intended 
use by the State of the prior recorded 
statement was not merely the intended 
use of the actual recording at trial, but 
also included an intent to use a 
derivative version of the defendant's 
statement during the State's case-in-
chief. !d. at 267, 757 A.2d at 805. 
The court reasoned that the State was 
not allowed to circumvent the pretrial 
disclosure requirement ofRule 4-263 
by using a derivative version of 
Johnson's statement through the 
interrogating officer. !d. 
Moreover, the court held, upon 
the defendant's request, the State 
must furnish a defendant's 
apparently available recorded 
statement made to a State agent. !d. 
This is true even if the State intends 
only to use the content of the 
recorded statement at trial and does 
not intend to use the physical recording 
itself. !d. The court reasoned that to 
hold otherwise would render Rule 4-
263(b )(2)(A) "a nullity." !d. 
The court had previously issued 
a word of caution regarding the 
potential consequences of failing to 
disclose a defendant's statement. !d. 
at 268-69, 757 A.2d at 806. If a 
statement was discoverable, yet not 
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provided, the trial court may within 
its discretion, impose a sanction under 
Rule 4-263(i). Id at 269, 757 A.2d 
at 806. These sanctions include 
discovery of the previously 
undisclosed item, striking the 
testimony related to the undisclosed 
matter, granting a continuance, 
prohibiting the introduction of 
evidence related to the matter not 
disclosed, granting a mistrial, or 
entering any other appropriate order. 
!d. This warning is even more 
applicable when a recorded statement 
is given to a State agent and appears 
to be available. !d. 
Disclosure requirements, the 
court reasoned, are designed to 
prevent the State from having 
largely unchecked discretion to 
summarize, edit, or characterize the 
content of a defendant's recorded 
statement in any form it chooses. Id 
at 268, 757 A.2d at 806. When a 
recorded statement is available, an 
oral delivery by a State's witness 
may not substitute or describe the 
nuances, qualities, or manner in 
which the interrogation was 
conducted. !d. Mere production 
of the substance of a defendant's 
prior recorded statement risks 
thwarting defense counsel's ability 
to determine the lawfulness of the 
interrogation or the evidence 
stemming from it. !d. 
In light of the court's holding that 
a derivative version of Johnson's 
statement was not a substitute for the 
apparently available recorded 
statement, the court next addressed 
whether the non-disclosure of the 
recording by the State was harmless 
error. !d. at 269, 757 A.2d at 806. 
An error is not harmless, and a 
reversal is mandated when the 
reviewing court, upon its own 
independent review of the record, is 
able to declare beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error in no way 
influenced the verdict. !d. The court 
then held that the error was not 
harmless and Johnson was 
prejudiced, reasoning that 
"[c]ommon sense and judicial 
experience teach that a defendant's 
prior statement in the possession of 
the government may be the single 
most crucial factor in the defendant's 
preparation for trial." !d. at 269-
70, 757 A.2d at 806-07 (citing 
United States v. Percevault, 490 
F.2d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
The court also reasoned that, 
"[ e ]very experienced trial judge and 
trial lawyer knows the value for 
impeaching purposes of statements 
of the witness recording the events 
before time dulls treacherous 
memory." !d. at 270, 757 A.2d at 
807 (citing Carr v. State, 284 Md. 
455, 460-61, 397 A.2d 606, 608-
09 (1979)). Therefore, the judgment 
of the court of special appeals was 
reversed, and the case was 
remanded to that court with 
directions to reverse the trial 
court's decision and to remand the 
case to that court for a new trial. 
!d. at271-72, 757 A.2d808. 
The Johnson decision stands for 
the proposition that where a defendant 
has made an apparently available 
recorded statement, the in court 
testimony of the interrogating officer 
is no substitute for the recording. The 
court's decision makes clear that 
prosecutors will not be allowed to 
encapsulate a defendant's recorded 
statement through the testimony of a 
State's witness. By so holding, the 
court has persevered a defendant's 
right to obtain discoverable State 
evidence. Thus, the court sends the 
message that where discovery 
requirements are clear from their 
plain meaning, the requirements of 
the rules will not be diminished by 
State wishes. 
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